An empirical assessment of us air force

The US Air Force is facing a record shortfall in pilots over the coming decade. Using personnel data on more than 10,000 Air Force pilots, this study examines the factors affecting the retention of pilots and assesses the effectiveness of the pilot bonus programme implemented by the Air Force to reduce attrition. Although surveys indicated sustained deployment rates were the leading cause of job dissatisfaction among Air Force pilots, the results of this study suggest economic factors had the largest impact on retention.     

A Proliferation of Royal Air Forces

Australia's interest in nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 60s is usually explained in terms of high politics and grand strategy. This proliferation case study explores, in greater detail than hitherto, the important part played by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in pressing for a nuclear capability. It seeks to understand the reasons behind the RAAF's lobbying, in particular its previous experience with air power, its visceral desire for advanced manned bomber aircraft, and its strong institutional link to the British Royal Air Force. The decision in 1963 to acquire the supersonic US F-111 strike aircraft, instead of rivals including the British TSR.2, is also considered. Once the RAAF's bomber ambitions were satisfied, interest in nuclear weapons was greatly reduced. Finally, some comments are included on the nuclear interests of other air forces in the British Commonwealth.     

Inventory control of a multiproduct system with a limited production resource

Optimal control of the production of several products subject to restricted production resources is considered. Linear production, holding and penalty costs are assumed although this is crucial only for production costs. Excess demand results in lost sales. A single point plays an important role in the definition of the optimal policy.     

The reliability of multicomponent systems subject to cannibalization

A reliability model for multicomponent multistate systems is presented. This is a generalization of a model previously studied by Hirsch, Meisner, and Boll. In the earlier model, when a failure occurs for which no replacement spare is available, the locations using the same type of part as that having failed are “cannibalized” so as to allocate the shortages to locations where they are least detrimental to system performance. Here, we permit certain restrictions to be imposed upon the cannibalization procedure, and develop effective techniques for relating the probability laws governing the level of system performance to the system structure, cannibalization policy, kit of spare parts, and part reliabilities.     

Learning to Fight and Fighting to Learn: Practitioners and the Role of Unit Publications in VIII Fighter Command 1943–1944

A military cannot hope to improve in wartime if it cannot learn. Ideally, in wartime, formal learning ceases and the application of knowledge begins. But this is optimistic. In 1942, USAAF Eighth Air Force assumed it had the means necessary for victory. In reality, its technique and technology were only potentially – rather than actually – effective. What remained was to create the practice of daylight bombing – to learn. This article (1) recovers a wartime learning process that created new knowledge, (2) tests existing tacit hypotheses in military adaptation research, and (3) offers additional theoretical foundation to explain how knowledge is created in wartime     

British Policy on Total Maritime Warfare and the Anti-Shipping Campaign in the Mediterranean, 1940–1944

During World War II, the British ran a sustained anti-shipping campaign against Axis merchant and supply traffic in the Mediterranean. Although the effects of this on the land war in North Africa have been the subject of much debate, little attention has been paid to the nature and prosecution of the campaign itself. This article analyses the changes in British attitudes and policy towards attacking merchant shipping prior to and throughout the campaign. It then goes on to examine the conduct of the campaign itself and compare it with other British efforts elsewhere during the war. It concludes that the anti-shipping campaign in the Mediterranean was a unique combined arms offensive for the British, and a major evolution in their attitudes and policy towards maritime total war.